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THE USE OF ENDORSEMENT IN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS-
THE KEY TO A NEW CONSENSUS
Joseph Richard Hurt*
INTRODUCTION
From the outset of its efforts to articulate and apply establish-
ment clause principles, the Supreme Court' has found the task
to be problematic.' Despite the initial promise of the Court's three-
part establishment clause analysis known as the Lemon Test,3 the
analysis has provided no greater degree of predictability than the
cases preceding it, has resulted in numerous five to four' and
plurality opinions,' and has drawn sharp attacks since the day it
was enunciated.' The criticisms, both from within the Court7 and
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I. The United States Supreme Court is hereinafter referred to as "the Court."
2. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (5-4 decision) (Everson represents the first attempt
by the Supreme Court to interpret the establishment clause.).
3. The Lemon Test was first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4. E.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Committee for Public Education
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
5. E.g., Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971). Cf Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (involving 6 different aid programs, resulting in 5 differ-
ent voting patterns by the Justices).
6. See Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and Sweet of Church-State Relations, 1971 SuP. CT. REv.
147, 148.
7. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Lemon is based
on an historically faulty doctrine which has made principled results difficult. Id. at 91); Committee for Public
Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (recognizing that the Lemon Test sacrifices clarity and predictability
for flexibility. Id. at 662.); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (calling for an abandonment of the Lemon Test and a return to the "no aid" Everson Test. Id. at 266.);
Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (referring to the Lemon
Test as "unnecessary [and] .. .superfluous tests." Id.).
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among legal scholars,' have mounted with each additional estab-
lishment clause decision leading critics to charge that the opin-
ions are lacking in principled bases.'
With growing dissatisfaction in both the application and results
of the Lemon analysis, the Supreme Court appeared on the verge
of abandoning the test in the early part of this decade, first by
ignoring it in a case involving legislative chaplains, 0 and then
by giving it only cursory application in the controversial crech6
case." Despite these signals, the Supreme Court emphatically re-
affirmed the Lemon Test in four cases decided during the 1984
term.' 2
Although this re-affirmation at first appeared as nothing more
than the Court's clinging to the only establishment clause analy-
sis ever to command a majority on the Court, 3 these four 1984
establishment clause opinions contain the framework for achiev-
ing clarity and understanding of the Court's efforts to protect es-
tablishment clause values. The key element in the framework lies
in Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach to the Lemon Test.'4
This approach, when merged with Justice Brennan's long-standing
judicial philosophy on the establishment clause, 5 provides the basis
for forging a new consensus on the Court for resolving establish-
ment clause issues.'
6
The purpose of this article is to complete the emerging theory
of endorsement as an analytical framework for resolving, on a
8. E.g., Curry, James Madison and the Burger Court: Converging Views of Church-State Separation, 56
INO. L.J. 615, 615 (1981) (doctrinal basis of the Burger Court's decisions seems convoluted); Giannella, supra
note 6, at 199, (establishment clause opinions lack "cogency and rationality"); Kurland, The Religion Clauses
and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 10 (1984) (characterizing the cases as a "hodge-podge of deci-
sions 1whichl sounds like it derived from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland"); Levinson, Separation of Church
and State: And the Wall Came Tumbling Down, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 707, 718 (1984)(Court's manipulation
of its standard illustrates weakness of Lemon Test); Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the
Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (1981) (Court's decisions
are characterized by "contradictory assertions, confusing signals, and unsupportable theses").
9. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, I., dissenting); see also, Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 680-81
(1980)("application of the Court's three-prong test has generated ad hoc judgments which are incapable of be-
ing reconciled on any principled basis").
10. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
I1. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Thornton
v. Caldor, 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
13. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 62 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
14. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
15. Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
16. Justice Brennan's reliance on Justice O'Connor's endorsement language in his most recent establishment
clause decision demonstrates the compatibility of his philosophy with the endorsement approach. See Edwards
v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3226 (1985).
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principled basis, all establishment clause issues and to show its
compatibility with core first amendment values. To accomplish
this objective, the article examines the origins and development
of the present Lemon Test in order to clarify the current status
of each element of the test. The Court's own characterizations
and criticisms of the test are then reviewed, illustrating the role
that internal disagreement has played in weakening the Lemon anal-
ysis. Since the parochial aid cases have drawn the most severe
criticism in establishment clause jurisprudence, the article sur-
veys these opinions and reveals the difficulty the Court has had
in applying the Lemon analysis on this issue.17 Justice O'Connor's
17. In Everson v. Board of Education, Justice Rutledge's dissent predicted that the majority of establishment
clause cases would come from efforts to channel tax dollars to religiously affiliated schools and attempts to
include religious exercises in the public schools. 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). In recent
years, several doctrinally significant cases have arisen in other contexts. E.g., Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S.
703 (1985) (state law preventing dismissal of employees who refuse to work on their designated Sabbath);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (city sponsored crechd or nativity scene); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983) (paid legislative chaplain); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (church veto
over granting of liquor licenses); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 229 (1982) (registration and reporting require-
ments upon religious organizations soliciting more than fifty percent of their funds from non-members), Walz
v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemptions for churches); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday Closing Laws). The Court has also rendered its most inconsistent results in the
parochial aid cases, despite the fact that the Lemon Test was first applied in such a case. Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
For example, a state may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain maps
of the United States, but the state may not lend maps of the United States for use in geography class.
A state may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George Washing-
ton, or a projector to show it in history class. A state may lend classroom workbooks, but may not
lend workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus rendering them non-reusable. A
state may pay for bus transportation to religious schools but not pay for bus transportation from the
parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip. A state may pay for diag-
nostic services conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different
building; speech and hearing 'services' conducted by the state inside the sectarian school are forbidden
[citation omitted], but the state may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian
school [citation omitted]. Exceptional parochial school students may receive counselling, but it must
take place outside the parochial school, such as in a trailer parked down the street [citation omitted].
A state may give cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of state-written tests and
state-ordered reporting services, but it may not provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular
subjects.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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endorsement theory," as modified by Justice Brennan,"' is then
introduced and critiqued to determine its suitability and adequa-
cy for dealing with establishment clause issues. The article then
expands Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach into a com-
plete analytical structure, drawing from Justice Brennan's origi-
nal establishment clause test first announced in his famous
Schempp concurrence.2" The article concludes with an examina-
tion of core first amendment principles to determine if these con-
cerns are adequately safeguarded by the Complete Endorsement
Analysis, and then explores its suitability for resolving various
perplexing establishment clause issues.
DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS
OF THE LEMON TEST
The Supreme Court announced its tripartite establishment clause
test which it has relied on for sixteen years21 in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 2 twenty-four years after the Court began interpreting the
establishment clause. 23 The Lemon Test requires that government
action have a secular legislative purpose, that it have a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and that the ac-
tion not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.24
The Court drew the first two elements of the test from Abington
v. Schempp,5 while taking the third prong of the test from Walz
v. Tax Commission,2" a case which upheld the constitutionality
of a state property tax exemption for religious properties used
solely for religious worship. In Lemon, the Court included the
issue of political divisiveness, an establishment clause concern
18. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19. Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3230 (1985).
20. Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
21. The only establishment clause case in which the Court completely ignored the Lemon Test was Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), involving the constitutionality of paid legislative chaplains. In Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the Court applied strict scrutiny to a state statute granting denominational prefer-
ence, but then applied the Lemon Test as well. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 696 n.2 (1984) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
23. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
24. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
25. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). This case credited two earlier establishment clause cases with the genesis
of the "purpose and effect" test: Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
26. 397 U.S. 664, 670, 674 (1970).
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recognized as early as McCollum v. Board of Education,7 as part
of the entanglement inquiry.2"
Because Lemon gave little guidance as to the application of the
three-part test, the analytical development of each inquiry has come
from the Court's subsequent use of the test. Although the cases
have been marked by inconsistency,29 a close examination of the
decisions reveals some broad generalizations about the elements
of the Lemon Test which prove helpful in developing the Com-
plete Endorsement Analysis.
Lemon and its progeny treat the requirement that government
action have a secular legislative purpose as an inquiry easily satis-
fied, with only three cases invalidating government action on this
basis.3" The first of these involved a Kentucky statute requiring
the posting of the Ten Commandments on the wall of every pub-
lic school classroom." In a per curiam opinion, the Court held
that the legislation had a "pre-eminent purpose" of promoting
religion, despite an "avowed" secular purpose. 2 The opinion,
however, failed to explain when an examination beyond the stat-
ed legislative purpose is justified or how it is quantified. In sharp
dissent, Justice Rehnquist pointed out the unprecedented nature
of the Court's rejection of a secular purpose which had been recog-
nized by both the legislature and the highest court of a state.33
In Wallace v. Jaffree,4 the second case to declare a state sta-
tute unconstitutional for want of a valid secular purpose, the Court
struck down Alabama's "moment of silence" legislation which ex-
pressly permitted prayer in the public schools. The Court held
that while government action partially motivated by religious con-
siderations may satisfy the secular purpose prong of the Lemon
Test, one entirely motivated by religious matters will not.35 The
appropriate question to ask, according to the majority opinion,
27. 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948).
28. 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971).
29. See supra, text accompanying notes 3-9.
30. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). But note that no program involving state aid to church related schools has been
found constitutionally infirm for want of a valid secular purpose.
31. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
32. Id. at 41.
33. Id. at 43. See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
majority of the Court, reiterated the point he made in his Stone dissent by saying that the secular purpose in-
quiry is ordinarily easily satisfied, because of the Court's reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to
a state if the secular purpose is "plausible" and easily discernible from the face of the statute).
34. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
35. Id. at 56.
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is whether government intends to endorse or disapprove religion."
The final case, Edwards v. Aguillard,37 considered the constitu-
tionality of a Louisiana statute providing for balanced teaching
of creation-science and evolution-science in the public schools.
Finding the legislative purpose to be similar to the one struck down
in Stone v. Graham,3" the Court held that the pre-eminent pur-
pose of the statute was to advance the religious belief of divine
creation of humanity. 9
From these three cases, a presumption emerges that legislation
has a valid secular purpose. The Court's rather sparse treatment
indicates that this presumption may be overcome only when the
overriding purpose is religious, or one entirely motivated by
religion.
Regarding the "primary effect" prong, the Court has most often
relied on this part of the Lemon Test to strike down government
actions which run afoul of the establishment clause. Unfortunately,
the Court has failed to present easily discernible guidelines for
discovering the primary effects of advancing religion." Analysis
of the relevant cases indicates that the Court's major concern in
the "primary effects" analysis is whether the aid directly or sub-
stantially advances religion, or whether the promotion of religion
is indirect and incidental. 1 A direct advancement has the primary
effect of advancing religion, while indirect and incidental advance-
ment passes this part of the Lemon analysis.
The Court has found direct and substantial advancement of
religion in each of three classes of cases: 1) when government
36. Id. at 60-61. But see, Id. at 107-09 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the secular purpose inquiry
has never been fully defined, and that this decision has made the constitutional inquiry turn upon "what legisla-
tors put in the legislative history and, more importantly, what they leave out." Id.). See also Levinson, supra
n.8 at 724-25 (arguing that the secular purpose requirement has forced the Court to ignore reality in order
to satisfy it, and also creates tension with the free exercise clause, which sometimes requires exceptions to
accommodate religious practices).
37. 107 S. Ct. 2563 (1987).
38. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
39. 107 S. Ct. 2563, 2581 (1987).
40. See Levinson, supra n.8 at 725-26 (pointing out that application of the effects prong has proven proble-
matical, since the Court has failed to clarify how much of a sectarian effect invalidates a government action
or program).
41. Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3228 (1985).
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aids a church-related institution permeated with religion; 2 2) when
government funds a specific religious activity in a substantially
secular setting;43 and 3) when government confers special benefits
on religious institutions."
Conversely, the Court has made it clear that not all incidental
aid to religiously affiliated institutions violates the establishment
clause. 5 If a religious institution is not pervasively religious,
government may fund the secular functions of the institution
provided these functions are clearly identifiable and are separa-
ble from the religious activities6 Only neutral, nonideological
aid that assists the secular aspects of an institution will withstand
a constitutional challenge. Moreover, this neutral aid may have
no more than an incidental effect of advancing religion. 7
Although the Court's application of the "primary effect" prong
is best understood when cast in terms of prohibiting direct and
substantial advancements of religion, as opposed to an injunction
against direct aid to church-related institutions, the two concepts
closely parallel. At the elementary and secondary parochial school
levels, the Court has, with only one exception, struck down direct
42. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680 (1971).
The Court has classified an institution as one permeated with religion or pervasively religious when a substan-
tial portion of its activities are subsumed with a religious mission. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743
(1973). If the institution is permeated with religion, then there can be no government aid, because of the impos-
sibility of separating secular activities from the religious ones. See Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426
U.S. 736, 755 (19,76). But see, Drinan, The Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in THE WALL
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 55, 64-65 (D. Oaks ed. 1963) (pointing out that those who oppose aid to reli-
giously affiliated schools on the basis of permeation of secular subjects with religion must be prepared to ac-
cept as an outgrowth of this position that secular humanism is the only type of "educational orthodoxy" a State
can fund).
43. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
44. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973) (striking down Pennsylvania's "Parent Reimbursement Act
for Non-public Education," where 90% of the children attending non-public schools were enrolled in religious
schools).
45. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) ("[T]he Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that
all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious
ends." Id.).
46. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a New
York plan to reimburse schools for expenses incurred in administering, grading, compiling and reporting results
of both teacher-prepared and state-prepared tests, as well as maintaining and reporting records required by
the state. This was because the aid devoted to secular functions could not be identified and separated from
aid to sectarian activities). See also Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 759-61 (1976). To deter-
mine if the aid was in fact extended to secular functions of a religious institution, the Court considers several
factors: the aid cannot specifically support religious activities; there is a presumption that those charged with
complying with the constitutional mandate will do so; and the Court will not anticipate possible unconstitution-
al use of the funds.
47. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973) (New York's tuition reimburse-
ment plan did not satisfy the primary effect prong because it failed to contain sufficient guarantees that the
funds would be used exclusively for secular, neutral, nonideological purposes).
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subsidies to religiously affiliated schools,48 while upholding in-
direct subsidies in all but one case.49 The Court, taking a differ-
ent approach to higher education,' has drawn a distinction between
pervasively and incidentally religious institutions. In the latter case,
the Court allows direct aid if secular activities can be separated
from religious ones' provided that religion is not singled out for
special benefit. 2
The final part of the Lemon analysis, the issue of excessive en-
tanglement, divides along two concerns: administrative entangle-
ment between government and the church; and political divisive-
ness. On administrative entanglement, the Court has given its
clearest guidelines; on divisiveness, it has produced none.
Administrative entanglement between church and state, if
characterized as excessive, is constitutionally impermissible." The
Court's concern is for the religious adherent as well as the non-
adherent, both of whom suffer when government becomes "en-
meshed" in matters of religious significance.54 To determine if
the administrative entanglement is excessive, the Court -has re-
lied on three factors: the character and purpose of the institution
48. Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding a statute directing payment
to non-public schools of costs incurred by them in complying with state-mandated requirements, including ad-
ministering and grading of state-prepared tests, reporting, and record keeping).
49. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down a state plan for tuition
reimbursement and tax relief for parents of children attending non-public schools).
50. See Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750 (1976). For purposes of determining both
the primary effect of government action and the issue of excessive entanglement, the Court has noted several
factors which distinguish higher education from pre-college education: "[clollege students are less susceptible
to religious indoctrination; college courses tend to entail an internal discipline that inherently limits the oppor-
tunities for sectarian influence; and a high degree of academic freedom tends to prevail at the college level."
Id. See also Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3223, n.6 (1985). The significance of these factors on
the issue of permeation has led the Court, as a matter of law, to accept this distinction between elementary
and secondary parochial education and religiously affiliated higher education.
51. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680 (1971).
52. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973).
53. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75
(1970). But see Choper, supra note 9, at 681-83 (stating that avoidance of administrative entanglement is not
a value to be secured by the establishment clause and should not be pursued at the expense of valid secular
goals or the value of preserving religious freedom); Giannella, supra note 6, at 148 (arguing that entanglement
raises more questions than it answers and is likely to become a "convenient label to help the Court announce
decisions arrived at on other grounds more difficult to articulate in terms of consistent legal theory"); Levin-
son, supra note 8, at 726 (claiming that entanglement has generated confusion).
54. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3237 (1985). While the threat to the non-adherent may be obvious
when government chooses to support religion, the danger to the benefited group may not be as clear at first
glance. The Court's concern for the latter is rooted in the fear that loss of independence will result when govern-
ment intrudes into sacred matters.
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benefited;" the nature of the aid; 6 and the resulting relationship."
The Court included political divisiveness, as an element of en-
tanglement, in Lemon v. Kurtzman. Although it was alluded to
in several earlier establishment clause cases,58 the first full dis-
cussion of the political divisiveness came from Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Walz."9 Justice Harlan believed that the es-
tablishment clause was designed to prevent government involve-
ment with religion because it leads to strife and friction in the
political system. The Court in Lemon characterized political divi-
siveness as entanglement which is of a broader and different
character than administrative entanglement.' The Court, however,
offered no guidelines as to how political divisiveness would be
determined. Instead, it assumed political divisiveness would oc-
cur over parochial aid in communities where a large percentage
of children attended religious schools, thus forcing both candi-
dates and voters to divide along religious lines.6"
The Court immediately began to diminish the significance of
political divisiveness in determining establishment clause viola-
tions.62 In a companion case to Lemon, the Court found divisive-
ness along religious lines to be less of a factor at the college level
than at the elementary and secondary levels of education. 3 Two
years later, while referring to political divisiveness as a "warn-
55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971); see also Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3238
(1985). The Court's distinction between pre-college and college education is significant in determining the is-
sue of administrative entanglement as well as primary effect. Roemer v. Board of Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766
(1976). Of the three factors used to assess entanglement, the Court has indicated that the character and purpose
of the institution benefited is the most significant factor and best explains the Court's holdings on entanglement.
56. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971). See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88
(197 1) (pointing out that in examining the nature of the aid, the crucial factor is whether the aid can be charac-
terized as nonideological).
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971). See also Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3238-39
(1985) (pointing out that what the Court examines under this sub-inquiry is the scope and duration of the state's
presence in the benefited institution to determine if detailed monitoring and close administrative contact are
required to ensure compliance with the constitutional standards). Cf Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746-47,
n.8 (1973) (the burden of proof as to the degree of church involvement rests upon the party challenging the aid).
58. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 422, 442 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320 (1952); McCollum
v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948).
59. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
60. 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (pointing out that while division and debate are normal and healthy in a
democratic system, division over matters of religion is "one of the principal evils against which the First Amend-
ment was intended to protect").
61. Id. But see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part If. The
Nonestablislhmera Principle, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 518 (1968) (arguing that to deny benefits to religion which
are available generally can result in invidious discrimination in favor of non-religion and lead to the type of
political dissension which the establishment clause is designed to prevent).
62. See Curry, supra note 8, at 635 (pointing out that while the early Burger Court decisions recognized
the importance of controlling religious factions, later cases have neglected this first amendment goal).
63. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971).
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ing signal not to be ignored," the Court sounded the death knell
of divisiveness as a vital part of entanglement inquiry by conced-
ing that division, standing alone, was probably inadequate for find-
ing an establishment clause violation.6" The Court dealt the
divisiveness inquiry a further blow in Mueller v. Allen65 by con-
fining it to cases involving direct financial subsidies to parochial
schools or their teachers. While the Court agrees that political
divisiveness is a core establishment clause concern, it has found
this query's place in the Lemon Test to be problematic.6
CHARACTERIZATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF THE LEMON TEST
The establishment clause cases decided prior to Lemon v. Kurtz-
man proved difficult for the Court to reconcile. 7 As a brief sur-
vey of the parochial aid cases indicates,6" the Lemon Test failed
to produce any greater clarity in establishment clause jurispru-
dence. This has resulted in part from the Court's own uneven per-
ception of the test as a basis for resolving church-state issues, in
addition to the test's insufficient analytical content.
As soon as the Court announced its definitive Lemon Test de-
rived from a clarification of the criteria of its prior decisions, 9
it began questioning the test's ability to resolve all establishment
clause issues. In Tilton v. Richardson," decided the same day as
Lemon, the Court acknowledged that in establishment clause cases,
the Lemon Test is incapable of being applied with constitutional
precision. The Court then warned against too literal a characteri-
zation of the Lemon formula as a "test," calling it "guidelines"
for determining whether or not a particular case meets the objec-
tives of the religion clauses."
The cases following Lemon and Tilton developed into a pattern
in which the Court's characterization of the test mirrored the degree
of its application. When the Court used the Lemon Test to strike
down government aid or action, its opinions employed such strong
64. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973).
65. 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n. 11 (1983), reaffirmed in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
66. But see Choper, supra note 9, at 683-85 (arguing that avoiding divisiveness should not be a value se-
cured by the establishment clause, since religious antagonism is a fact of life in a pluralistic governmental system).
67. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (attributing the inconsistencies of these opinions
to "too sweeping utterances on aspects of these [religion] clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular
cases but have limited meaning as general principles.").
68. See supra notes 85-120 and accompanying text.
69. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
70. 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971).
71. Id. at 678.
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terms as, "the essential inquiry,"72 "the now well-defined three-
part test,"73 and "a convenient, accurate distillation of this Court's
efforts [to determine violations of the establishment clause, provid-
ing] the proper framework of analysis."74 However, in cases where
the Court employed the test less harshly, the opinions applied
weaker characterizations such as "guidelines"75 or "signposts,"7"
claiming establishment clause jurisprudence was not confined to
any one test or mode of analysis."
This variance in judicial attitude forced the Court to doubt the
theory on which it had based its rhetoric. As early as Committee
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 8 the Court
admitted that, although establishment clause principles were well
settled, its application of these principles was unclear. This is
reflected by the many concurring and dissenting opinions in the
cases. The Court later recognized that its decisions were sacrificing
"clarity and predictability for flexibility." 9 In the same opinion,
Justice White predicted a continued unevenness of results until
the Court could reach agreement on a unified standard of review."
The search for a more stable theory continued.
A majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court, including form-
er Chief Justice Burger who authored the test, have expressed
dissatisfaction with the Lemon analysis. During this decade, three
Justices have called for an abandonment of the test," while at least
four others have proposed modifications to the test itself or its
application." With verbal defenders of the test narrowed to only
two members of the Court in 1985,83 the subsequent reaffirma-
tion of the tripartite Lemon Test surprised many Court observers.
72. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472, 481 (1973).
73. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973).
74. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975).
75. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
76. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
77. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
78. 413 U.S. 756, 761 n.5.
79. Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
80. Id.
81. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Committee for Public Education
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White,
J., concurring).
82. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987)(Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 259 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring
and dissenting).
83. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 62 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 696 n.2 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. E.g., McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S. CT. REV. 1,2 (1984 Term was marked by a
return to the separationist doctrine, which was unexpected in light of the doubt cast on Lemon in the two preceding
terms).
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PAROCHIAL AID: PROBLEMS WITH THE LEMON ANALYSIS
Although the Lemon Test is applicable to all establishment clause
inquiries," the majority of decisions in this area have involved
government attempts to provide financial support to church-related
schools or the students attending such schools. Because these cases
have provided the main testing ground for the Lemon analysis,
a brief survey of these opinions illustrates the difficulty the Court
has had in applying the three-part test to achieve consistent results.
Prior to the Lemon decision, the Court decided only two parochi-
al aid cases on establishment clause grounds.' In the first of these,
Everson v. Board of Education,87 the Court passed on the con-
stitutionality of a school board resolution which, pursuant to a
state statute, authorized reimbursement of public transportation
costs to parents of children attending both public and Catholic
schools. In the Court's opinion, which inaugurated the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the establishment clause, Justice Black
took a strict no-aid position, arguing that the framers of the first
amendment intended to create a "wall of separation between church
and state."" Despite this absolutist language, the Court upheld
the program as one promoting the general welfare, with only in-
direct benefits to church-related institutions.89
85. See supra note 2 1.
86. The first constitutional challenge to a state attempt to aid church-related schools involved furnishing
free textbooks to children attending both public and private schools in Louisiana. The plaintiffs in that case
alleged the program amounted to a taking of private property for private use, in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court upheld the program on the basis that the appropriation, which benefited the students
and not the schools, was a public purpose within the taxing power of the state. The plaintiffs did not assert
an establishment clause challenge. Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
87. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
88. The famous interpretation of the establishment clause in Everson states:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any reli-
gious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
church and state.'
330 U.S. I, 15-16 (1947).
89. The dissenters in this case agreed with the majority on two major points of interpretation: first, the
meaning of the establishment clause is found in the views of Jefferson and Madison; and second, the separation
of church and state mandated by the first amendment is to be "complete" and "permanent." See 330 U.S. 1,
31 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The point of departure for the dissenters was the majority's approval of
this form of indirect aid.
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More than twenty years passed before the Court faced another
challenge to a state effort to aid church-related education. In Board
of Education v. Allen, 9' the Court relied on the result reached in
Everson, rather than its absolute separation theory, in approving
a New York statute which loaned textbooks to all students in grades
seven through twelve, including those attending parochial schools.
Applying what would become the "purpose" and "effect" prongs
of the Lemon Test, 9' the Court upheld the statute on a finding
that the express legislative purpose furthered the educational op-
portunities of the young with no risk of advancing religion. The
state had furnished only secular textbooks, with the financial
benefit inuring to the parents and children, not to the schools.92
The Court completed its general framework for establishment
clause analysis in Lemon v. Kurtzman,93 along with the distinc-
tions drawn in Tilton v. Richardson,9" decided the same day. In
Lemon, the Court addressed the constitutionality of two plans.
The first was a Rhode Island program to supplement the salaries
of non-public elementary school teachers. The second was a Penn-
sylvania plan to allow the state to purchase secular educational
services from the non-public schools, resulting in reimbursement
to the schools of costs for teacher's salaries, textbooks, and in-
structional materials. In a radical departure from the results in
Everson and Allen, the Court struck down both programs, distin-
guishing them from prior approved programs which involved secu-
lar, neutral and nonideological aid. 95 Although both programs in
question included detailed procedures to insure secular educational
use of the funds, the Court found the programs constitutionally
infirm because they violated the third part of the newly announced
test by causing excessive entanglement.96
90. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
91. The Court applied the "purpose and effect" test articulated in Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222 (1963).
92. 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968). The Court refused to accept the proposition that the secular and religious
training in the parochial schools was so intertwined that textbooks could not be furnished without advancing
religion, since no evidence had been offered to support this contention.
93. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
94. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
95. 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971); see also Giannella, supra note 6, at 148. "In the Allen case in 1967, the
Court went over the verge and sanctioned the free loan of textbooks. In Lemon the Court sought to scramble
back, reaching out for any support it could find on the constitutional landscape. The nearest at hand was the
'excessive entanglement' notion recently enunciated by the Walz case and the Court seized it. The Court thus
put itself in an even more awkward position.". Id.
96. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971) (contrary to Allen, supra note 92, the Court held that there was suffi-
cient evidence offered at the District Court level to indicate the "substantial religious character" of the church-
related schools involved, which prevented assurance that the kind of aid involved would not advance religion,
absent "entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religious Clauses sought to avoid." Id.).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
In Tilton, the Court confronted the constitutionality of Title I
of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,"7 which provided
Federal grants and loans to all institutions of higher education for
construction of academic facilities.9" Signaling its intent to treat
aid to church-related colleges and universities differently from
aid to elementary and secondary educational institutions, the plural-
ity found that the statute satisfied the Lemon Test, except for its
twenty year statute of limitations on the government's interest in
the facilities." The opinion held that the maturity of college stu-
dents and the lack of religious permeation of the schools in ques-
tion presented less risk that the aid would either advance religion
or entangle the state with the church."'
In the four major elementary and secondary school aid cases
following Lemon' the new consensus remained intact, with the
Court refusing to approve new forms of aid. The Court struck
down five different aid programs12 for their failure to contain suffi-
cient guarantees that the funds would not be used for religious
purposes,0 3 while disapproving a sixth form of aid on entangle-
ment grounds." 4 The only pre-college parochial aid to survive
97. 77 Stat. 364 (as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-21 (1964 and Supp. V)).
98. 403 U.S. 672. 677 (1971) (the act expressly prohibited the use of the facilities for religious purposes).
99. Note that the Court, unlike the decisions which followed involving pre-college parochial aid, refused
to accept a "hypothetical profile" of the typical sectarian college or university. Id. at 682.
100. See Giannella, supra note 61, at 516,584-86 (arguing that government should be allowed more involve-
ment with religion on the higher education level than at the elementary and secondary levels because: "[F]irst,
the functions and purposes of the state in higher education are much different from those in lower education;
and second, religious perspectives enter into the learning process in a very different manner on each level."
Giannella also gives three reasons why government aid should not be denied to a university because of a reli-
giously oriented commitment: support in the form of scholarships and grants promotes the personal choices
of the students and enhances the free exercise of religion; it enhances the rights of the students and teachers
to full academic freedom; and it encourages diversity in higher education). Cited in Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 686, nn.3-4. But see L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT 54 (1984) (taking
issue with the Court's reasoning in distinguishing higher education from pre-college aid. First, as to the argu-
ment that college students are less vulnerable to religious influences, Pfeffer points out that a substantial num-
ber of converts to cults are of college age. "[Elven if that were not so, the establishment clause forbids governmeit
financing of unsuccessful no less than successful efforts to inculcate religious commitments." Id. at 54. Se-
cond, Pfeffer argues that aid to the non-sectarian aspect of religiously affiliated colleges and universities frees
up other monies to be used for religious purposes).
101. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973);
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
102. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loan of instructional material and equipment); Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for expenses in administering and grading
tests and reporting records required by the state); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (provisions for maintenance and repair of facilities, tuition reimbursement and tax relief for parents
of children in non-public schools).
103. It should be noted that these forms of aid, which were drafted following the Lemon decision, purpose-
fully omitted checks to assure compliance, in order to avoid entanglement problems.
104. Meek, 421 U.S. 349, 370-71 (1975) (non-ideological auxiliary services provided in the non-public school
facility by state personnel. Although elaborate safeguards were not provided, the Court held that the type of
surveillance needed to avoid advancement of religion would lead to excessive entanglement).
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the Lemon analysis was a textbook loan program, which the Court
upheld on the basis of stare decisis, as constitutionally indistin-
guishable from the program approved in Allen. '05 According to
Justice White, who dissented in each of these cases,' the Court's
three-part test had created an insoluble paradox; excessive en-
tanglement could only be avoided by running the risk of advanc-
ing religion.0 7 Furthermore, the Court's decisions clouded the
indirect/direct aid distinction for determining permissible pro-
grams, which had seemed clear in the prior holdings of Everson
and Allen. During this same period of time, the Court continued
its distinction between higher educational institutions and elemen-
tary and secondary schools by approving programs which direct-
ly benefited religiously affiliated colleges and universities."'
The strict approach to pre-college parochial aid collapsed in
Wolman v. Walter,"°9 a case involving six different aid programs.
Both the differing votes of the Justices on the programs, and the
number of separate opinions recorded, demonstrated the divisions
on the Court as to the proper application of the Lemon Test. For
the first time since Lemon, new forms of aid survived judicial
scrutiny," 0 and the Court reaffirmed textbook loans based on Al-
len and Meek. The Court, however, refused to approve the loan
of instructional materials, but failed to distinguish between the
use of such materials in the educational process and the use of
textbooks."' Likewise, the Court declined to extend the Everson
bus ride to include field trips.
Three years after Wolman, the Court moved even further away
from its initial applications of Lemon by approving direct subsi-
105. Id. at 359.
106. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 381 (1975) (White, J., joining an opinion filed by Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 813 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
107. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 425 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring). But see,
L. PFEFFER, supra note 100, at 29 (arguing that the insoluble paradox could very well have been intended
by the framers, who wanted to prevent both tax raised funds from being used to support religious instruction
and government intrusion into the religious domain).
108. Roemer, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (non-categorical grants to private colleges, some of which were reli-
giously affiliated), Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (state issuance of revenue bonds for a Baptist college).
109. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
110. Programs approved included: speech, hearing and psychological diagnostic services on the non-public
school premises, and remedial services off the non-public campuses. Id. at 255.
111. See Curry, supra note 8, at 634 (pointing out that there was no way for the Court to distinguish loans
of textbooks from loans of instructional materials and equipment, therefore, it has chosen simply to ignore
the inconsistency. This has not only encouraged legislators to test new forms of aid, but also has given cre-
dence to the dissenters' arguments).
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dies to elementary and secondary parochial schools.11 ' Ironical-
ly, seven years earlier in Levitt, the Court had stricken a similar
program." 3 A continued loosening of the Lemon standard occurred
in Mueller v. Allen,"' where the Court upheld tax deductions for
tuition, textbooks, and transportation costs incurred by parents
in sending their children to non-public schools. The majority opin-
ion by Justice Rehnquist distinguished the program from a simi-
lar one struck down in Nyquist"' on the basis that the deductions
were available to all parents, including those with children in public
schools, despite the fact that non-public school parents were the
principal beneficiaries." 6
With the decreased significance that the Lemon Test played in
two key cases outside the parochial aid spectrum following
Mueller,"7 the fate of the three-pronged analysis became more
uncertain. However, in a surprise move in 1985 reminiscent of
its initial post-Lemon decisions, the Court struck down three pro-
grams involving supplemental and remedial aid, while unequivo-
cally re-affirming Lemon as the analytical framework for
addressing establishment clause issues.8
Although this action seemed to represent nothing more than
preserving the status quo, a closer examination of the opinions
reveals that the three-part analysis did not emerge unchanged from
its embattled fourteen-year history. The most significant differ-
ence lies in the Court's reliance on the endorsement approach to
the Lemon analysis. Justice O'Connor first articulated this approach
in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,"9 which she ex-
panded upon in a later opinion. 20 The freshness and originality
of her analysis has led to quick acceptance by the Court of her
language and terminology.1 ' While subsequent opinions give hope
112. Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (direct aid approved included reim-
bursements for costs incurred in complying with state mandated testing, scoring, and recording). Cf Crocken-
burg, An Argument for the Constitutionality of Direct Aid to Religious Schools, 13 J. L. & EDUC. 1, 1-2 (1984)
(arguing that the Court's denial of direct aid on the basis of political divisiveness is both historically and empiri-
cally doubtful).
113. Levitt, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
114. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
115. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
116. Despite its weakening effect on the Lemon analysis, Mueller did revive the direct/indirect distinction
which had become blurred in Nyquist. 463 U.S. 388, 389 (1983).
117. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing a city sponsored crechd as part of a Christmas dis-
play); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding a paid legislative chaplain).
118. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
119. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind,
106 S. Ct. 748 (1986); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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that a new consensus is emerging, caution is required. Despite
its attractiveness, endorsement as an analytical framework is still
elusive, and its ability to offer a viable alternative to the battered
Lemon Test depends on its further refinement.
ENDORSEMENT As AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
Justice O'Connor's endorsement theory is significant both from
a conceptual and an analytical standpoint. On the first level, it
accomplishes a concise articulation of the protections guaranteed
by the establishment clause, a concept that has eluded the Court
for years. As an analytical framework, it contains the potential
for a more insightful, objective inquiry into establishment clause
issues.
Under Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach, the most im-
portant function of the establishment clause is to insure that govern-
ment's relationship with religion does not affect an individual's
standing in the political community.' 22 To accomplish this, govern-
ment must take care to avoid both excessive involvement with
religious institutions and endorsement or disapproval of religion.'23
Governmental endorsement or disapproval is the more direct of
the two types of infringement, which results in treatment of those
not in the favored group as less than full members of the political
community."' The significance of religion to the political process
is at the heart of her endorsement concept.
With her clarification of the central function of the establish-
ment clause, Justice O'Connor has remodeled the Lemon Test to
improve it as an analytic device. 2' Under her approach, the key
issue of whether the government has endorsed or disapproved
religion, along with the companion issue of entanglement, can
be addressed under her restatement of the "purpose" and "effect"
122. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. Id. According to Justice O'Connor, excessive entanglement threatens the independence of religious in-
stitutions, gives religious groups access to governmental power not shared by others and fosters political divi-
sions along religious lines.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 689.
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prongs of the Lemon Test. 26 First, the establishment clause re-
quires a determination of whether the government's actual pur-
pose is to endorse or disapprove religion."'2 In considering this,
Justice O'Connor argues that the Court's examination of the legis-
lative intent should be deferential and limited. If the legislature
states a secular purpose or disclaims the intent to promote religion,
then, as a general rule, that judgment should be honored. Even
if the statute fails to contain an express secular purpose in either
its text or official history, it should fail the purpose prong only
if the Court finds beyond question that the law's rationale is an
endorsement of religion or religious belief.2 ' Ordinarily, the is-
sue of whether government intended to endorse or disapprove
religion should be determined by judging a statute or enactment
on its face, by its legislative history, or from its interpretation
by a responsible administrative agency.129
The second inquiry under Justice O'Connor's revision of the
Lemon Test is whether government action conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. The crucial question under the former
"effects" prong was not whether the government action had ad-
vanced or inhibited religion, but rather whether government had
126. Initially, entanglement would have remained as a separate rung in Justice O'Connor's revised structure,
"properly limited to institutional entanglement," thus omitting political divisiveness as a part of the analytical
framework. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, following
her dissent in Aguilar v. Felton, it is doubtful whether she would keep institutional entanglement as a separate
establishment clause inquiry. Although she identified excessive entanglement in Lynch as one of the two ways
government commits the forbidden practice of making religion relevant to one's standing in the political com-
munity, Justice O'Connor's dissent further limits entanglement to a factor "relevant to deciding the effect of
a statute which is alleged to violate the establishment clause." In her opinion, "[I]f a statute lacks a purpose
or effect of advancing or endorsing religion, I would not invalidate it merely because it requires some ongoing
cooperation between church and state or some state supervision to ensure that state funds do not advance religion."
105 S. Ct. 3232, 3248 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (according to Justice O'Con-
nor, inquiry into the intent of government action is the subjective component of the message which is being
communicated).
128. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Comment, Lemon Recon-
stituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modification of the Lemon Test For Establishment Clause Violations,
1986 B.Y.U.L. REV. 465, 471 (arguing that under Justice O'Connor's approach, once an improper purpose
is determined, the state action will be declared unconstitutional, regardless of whether there are additional secular
reasons for the action. Likewise, the Comment contends that under Justice O'Connor's revised purpose prong,
tradition may no longer be used as a legitimate secular purpose).
129. In answer to Justice Rehnquist who, in his dissenting opinion, argued that this approach makes the con-
stitutionality of a statute turn on what was or was not put in the legislative history, Justice O'Connor countered
with two arguments: first, courts are capable of recognizing "sham" secular purposes; and second, the require-
ment "reminds government that when it acts, it should do so without endorsing a particular religious belief
or practice that all citizens do not share." Id. at 2517. ,
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communicated a message of endorsement or disapproval. 3 ' Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, this inquiry is a mixed question of
law and fact, 3' which should be determined from the viewpoint
of the "objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and the implementation of the statute .""' Since entangle-
ment does not survive under her scheme as a separate element
of the analysis, "pervasive institutional involvement of Church
and State" must be considered as a factor bearing on the issue
of whether or not there has been actual endorsement.'
Although Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Wallace v.
Jaffree34 relied heavily on the endorsement terminology in dis-
cussing the secular purpose prong of the Lemon Test,13 it did
little to develop endorsement as an analytical device. However,
when the Court expressly re-affirmed the Lemon Test the majority
not only embraced the endorsement concept, but built upon Justice
O'Connor's foundation. 3 ' Relying on the first amendment princi-
ple of separation of church and state which avoids "too close a
proximity,"'37 the Court held that government promotes religion
when it allows a close identification of governmental power with
religion. According to Justice Brennan, if this identification con-
veys a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion, "a core
purpose of the establishment clause is violated."'38 The Court next
stated that a key inquiry under the "effects test" is whether the
government's identification with religion creates a "symbolic un-
ion of Church and State . . .sufficiently likely to be perceived
by adherents of the controlling denomination as an endorsement,
and by the non-adherents as a disapproval of their individual re-
ligious choices."'39 Justice Brennan concluded that if there is a
symbolic union of government with religion in a sectarian under-
130. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (this is the objective compo-
nent of the message communicated by the government action to the community). See Comment, supra note
28 at 472-74 (arguing that under Justice O'Connor's revised effects prong, a message of endorsement received
by minority religious groups would be sufficient for a constitutional violation, even if it would only indirectly
advance the majority religion under the Lemon Test).
131. Id. at 693-94.
132. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see McConnell, supra note
83 at 48 (criticizing Justice O'Connor's "objective observer" as an inadequate substitute for a constitutional
standard. According to McConnell, this approach only avoids stating what considerations must be made to
determine if a statute passes constitutional muster and, if adopted, would give judges the leeway to decide
cases the way they think they should be decided).
133. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3248 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
135. Id. at 56, nn. 41-42.
136. Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
137. Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
138. Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3226 (1985).
139. Id.
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taking, the effect runs afoul of the establishment clause. 141
While the Grand Rapids opinion added substance to the second
level of Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis under her re-
vised Lemon Test, the approach still requires further refinement
if it is to protect the full range of establishment clause principles. 1
4 1
As Justice O'Connor has correctly recognized, the inquiry into
whether government has endorsed or disapproved religion should
be the central issue in establishment clause analysis.14 However,
as currently developed, in both her opinions and Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion in Grand Rapids, this query has centered
on the perception created by the government action. The ques-
tion here has become whether government communicated a mes-
sage of endorsement or created a symbolic union with religion.
Although this inquiry is especially adequate in cases involving
religious symbols and government efforts to include religious prac-
tices in otherwise public settings, it does not protect all establish-
ment clause principles. In particular, the inquiry fails to address
the establishment clause prohibition of government financial sup-
port, sponsorship or active involvement with religion.'4 Indeed,
for this reason, the issue of whether or not government has in
fact endorsed or disapproved religion must be broadened to in-
clude an equally important consideration. This inquiry should ad-
dress whether the religious purposes or activities of religious
institutions have been promoted, in addition to whether or not
a message of endorsement has been communicated. If govern-
ment has in fact promoted such religious purposes or activities,
then it has endorsed religion in a way that runs contrary to the
establishment clause.
In refining the endorsement-in-fact inquiry, Justice Brennan's
long-standing judicial philosophy on the establishment clause is
both compatible with the O'Connor approach and contains some
helpful guidelines. The most concise encapsulation of the Bren-
nan position is contained in his famous Schempp concurrence and
reiterated in many of his subsequent establishment clause opin-
140. Id. at 3227.
141. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Cf Loewy, Rethinking
Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential Of O'Con-
nor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1049 (arguing that Justice O'Connor's endorsement theory is consistent with
our constitutional heritage, but its serious implementation will require the rethinking of some firmly entrenched
practices).
142. Id. at 690.
143. The relationship of establishment clause principles to the Complete Endorsement Analysis is discussed
fully in the next section.
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ions." According to the Brennan analysis, the establishment clause
forbids government involvement with religion that: a) promotes
the religious activities of religious institutions; b) uses the arm
of the state for essentially religious purposes; or c) accomplishes
legitimate governmental objectives with religious means, when
secular avenues are available.' 5 These first two queries are use-
ful in determining whether government action has promoted the
religious purposes or activities of religious institutions. The third
query is relevant to the issue of whether government has com-
municated a message of endorsement.
A second problem with the O'Connor analysis, as it presently
stands, is its elimination of entanglement as a separate inquiry
or standard.' 6 Although she is correct in stating that the political
divisiveness aspect of the entanglement prong is too elusive to
be part of the analytical framework,' 7 the degree of institutional
involvement between government and religion is highly relevant
to the issue of endorsement and simply cannot be evaluated ade-
quately under the second level of her reformation of the Lemon
Test. As Justice O'Connor has correctly recognized, excessive
entanglement is one of the major ways in which government vio-
lates the establishment clause.' 8 Therefore, any proposed method
of analysis must be careful to ensure that government avoids this
pitfall. The Court recognized this in Aguilar, where it re-affirmed
the entanglement prong as an essential ingredient in establishment
clause analysis.' 9
With the incorporation of these key alterations, the Complete
Endorsement Analysis emerges to offer principled results in es-
tablishment clause cases. The Analysis can therefore be con-
veniently developed in answer to three questions:
1) Did the government intend to endorse or disapprove of
religion? Consistent with Justice O'Connor's approach, judicial
inquiry at this level should be deferential and limited. Despite
Justice Rehnquist's concern that this type of inquiry is meaning-
less, '5 it is important in dealing with feigned secular purposes
144. Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 705 n. I1 (1984) (Brennan, I., dissenting), Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 801 n. I1 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 750 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting), Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 643 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting), Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
145. Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963).
146. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3243 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 687-88.
149. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985),
150. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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put forth by legislatures.' 5' This inquiry also serves to remind
government that its actions can not amount to an endorsement of
a particular religious belief or practice.'52 This question, moreover,
focuses all persons in the decision-making process on this con-
trolling principle.
2) Did the government action in fact endorse or disapprove of
religion? As the heart of the establishment clause analysis, the
determination of endorsement-in-fact must include both the per-
ception of government's relationship to religion and the degree
to which the state is responsible for promoting religion. Regard-
ing this first aspect, government communicates a message of en-
dorsement in one or more of three principal ways: a) when it is
closely identified with religion, creating a symbolic union with
religion which makes the benefited group feel like insiders, while
others are made to feel as outsiders; b) when it attempts to ac-
complish its purposes by employing religious means, when secu-
lar ones are available; and finally, c) when it singles out religion
for special treatment or benefits.
The second aspect of endorsement-in-fact deals with the use
of government power to promote religion itself. Government ac-
tion most likely to fall in this category is financial support to reli-
giously affiliated institutions. Here the concern is not with every
incidental or indirect benefit that flows from government to a re-
ligious body, but rather the extent to which the government aid
promotes the religious mission of the benefited institution. In de-
termining if government has promoted that mission, the analysis
draws sustenance from the Lemon progeny's delineation of what
is a direct and substantial advancement of religion. Consequent-
ly, government promotes religion under the endorsement-in-fact
query if it directly aids a church-related institution that is per-
151. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (Louisiana statute requiring balanced teaching of creation-
science and evolution science in the public schools held to have the preeminent purpose of advancing the reli-
gious belief of divine creation of humanity, despite the state's claim that it advanced academic freedom); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Alabama statute authorizing a one-minute period in all public schools
"for meditation or voluntary prayer" held to have been entirely motivated by religion); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (Kentucky statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased
with private contributions, on the wall of each public classroom in the state. The statute required the following
notation in small print at the bottom of each display: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is
clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the common law of the
United States." The Court held that despite this "avowed" secular purpose, the "preeminent" purpose was reli-
gious. Id.).
152. See supra note 129.
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meated with religion, or if it funds a specific religious activity
in a substantially secular setting.'53
3) Has government excessively entangled itself with religion?
The degree of involvement between government and religion must
remain as a separate element of the endorsement analysis. The
Court must guard against the kind of ongoing relationship which
either threatens the independence of the religious institution in-
volved or gives religion access to government power not shared
by others.' 54
ENDORSEMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRINCIPLES
The extent to which the Complete Endorsement Analysis will
succeed in clarifying the Lemon Test depends on its ability to pro-
tect core concerns of the establishment clause as well as its ana-
lytical precision. Since Everson and the birth of establishment
clause interpretation, the Court has struggled to articulate the
meaning of the phrase "no law respecting an establishment of
religion."'55 Despite this difficulty, six consistent principles emerge
which have enjoyed the support of the Court since 1947. 5 As
the second Mr. Justice Harlan concluded a year before the Le-
mon Test was announced, "[I]t is far easier to agree on the pur-
pose that underlies the First Amendment's Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that
should govern their application."5 7 An examination of these six
principles reflects the extent to which they are embodied in the
Complete Endorsement Analysis.
The first principle, recognized with virtual unanimity on the
Court since Everson, is that the establishment clause is more than
an injunction against adopting a national church. 5 ' Although Ever-
son was a 5-4 decision, the Court reflected its unity on this prin-
153. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. But note that the issue of whether religion has been
singled out for special treatment or benefit relates more to whether government has communicated a message
of endorsement than it does to the specific query of whether or not the religious mission of an institution has
been benefited.
154. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3237 (1985).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
156. A restatement of these concerns or values not only serves to test the strength and validity of the Com-
plete Endorsement Analysis, but also clarifies any doubts cast on these principles by a small minority of the
justices on the Court. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(calling for a reassessment of the entire establishment clause tradition), (White, J., dissenting) (joining Justice
Rehnquist in the call for a reassessment), (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the establishment clause is
designed to prevent the "establishing of a state religion." Id. at 92.).
157. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., separate opinion).
158. But see infra note 156.
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ciple a year later when Justice Frankfurter concluded that the Court
was in total agreement that the establishment clause went much
further than merely forbidding an established church.'59 A second
parallel principle likewise traces its origins to the Everson opin-
ion. This principle forbids government discrimination or favored
treatment on religious grounds, as opposed to mere preference
of one religion over another.' 0 The Court affirmed this principle
the following year despite efforts by the defendants to convince
the judges to adopt a more limited construction of the clause.'
The concept has remained constant in interpretation to the
present. 2
Both of these principles are embodied in the Complete Endorse-
ment Analysis. The framework accomplishes this not only by
preventing government from considering religion in terms of an
individual's standing in the political community, but also by pro-
hibiting symbolic unions of church and state, as well as favored
treatment of any or all religions. Principles one and two are like-
wise guaranteed by the injunction against government's promo-
tion of the religious beliefs or missions of church-related
institutions.
Two other principles which have been themes throughout es-
tablishment clause opinions involve the concepts of neutrality and
separation. Unlike the first two principles, which have remained
unchanged, the principles of neutrality and separation have un-
dergone significant doctrinal development.
As to neutrality, the third principle, the Court initially defined
it in absolute terms in an attempt to mandate complete govern-
ment neutrality toward religion.' 3 The Court, however, soon
recognized that while government must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine and practice, and between religion and
159. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 213 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion). Even
with continued affirmation of this principle in nearly every establishment clause case, at least two members
of the Court have attempted to limit the scope of the establishment clause to a prohibition against a state religion.
See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3242 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 100-06, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673, 678,
686 (1984) (opinion by Burger, C.J.); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 122 (1982) (opinion by Burger,
C.J.); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (opinion by Burger, C.J.).
160. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). For the full text of this passage see supra note 87.
161. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
162. The only Justice to attempt to limit the establishment clause to a prohibition against denominational
preference was Justice Rehnquist. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
163. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); Zorach v. Clauson, 342 U.S. 306, 319
(1952) (Black, J., dissenting). See Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48
U. PirT. L. REV. 83, 94-98 (1986) (claiming that Justice Black put the neutrality principle on a collision course
by subjecting it to two conflicting requirements: government may not aid religion; yet government may not
exclude anyone from the general benefits of public welfare legislation because of their religion).
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non-religion,"' it must accommodate competing free exercise
values. Consequently, constitutional neutrality is not a "straight
line.""6 5 On the eve of the announcement of the Lemon Test, the
Court characterized this first amendment value as "benevolent neu-
trality. ""' This term continues to epitomize the current principle. "7
Consistent with this interpretation, the Complete Endorsement
Analysis does not require absolute neutrality by the state toward
religion. Instead, it allows room for government to acknowledge
religion to the extent it stops short of actually endorsing it. 8 This
accommodation is of particular importance when government acts
to allow individuals the opportunity to practice their religion." 9
A major strength of the Endorsement Analysis is its ability to deal
in a principled way with government acknowledgements of religion
and accommodations of religious beliefs. In contrast, the origi-
nal Lemon analysis failed to adequately address this issue, forc-
164. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). But see Gorman, A Catholic View: Toward a More
Perfect Union Regarding the American Civil Liberty of Religion in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
41, 46-52 (D. Oaks ed., 1963) (arguing that "irreligion" should not be within the purview of the religious guaran-
tees, but rather should look to the non-religious guarantees in the Bill of Rights for protection. If this were
the case, then there would be no inhibition toward government actions aimed at securing religious liberty, and
actions taken to avoid abridgement of free exercise by the state would not he considered aiding or establishing
religion).
165, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). See also Giannella, supra note 61, at 514-15
(arguing that with the active role the state has undertaken in allocating resources and structuring the social
order, the denial of benefits to religious groups is not only unnecessary under the establishment clause, but
may actually frustrate its purposes).
166. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
167, Despite the centrality of this principle to the establishment clause, it too has been criticized. See Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)(claiming that the neutrality principle has
long aggravated the conflict between the establishment and free exercise clauses). See also (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) Id. at 113. But see Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45
Mo. L. REV. 352, 378-82 (1986) (arguing that the neutrality principle was significantly damaged by the Lynch
case, but rehabilitated in Estate of Thorton, Grand Rapids, and Jaffree, primarily by repudiating the Lynch
plurality notion that the establishment clause only forbids the creation of a state religion or church).
168. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
169. With regard to the clash between the establishment and free exercise clauses, Justice O'Connor sees
the solution as lying in "identifying workable limits to the government's license to promote the free exercise
of religion," not in "neutrality." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Accord-
ingly, she would modify her establishment clause test in cases where government acts to lift a government-
imposed burden, and individual resentments of the exemption given the religious observer "would be entitled
to little weight if the Free Exercise Clause strongly supports the exemption." Id.; accord Comment, A Non-
Conflict Approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 131 U. Prtr. L. REV. 1175, 1178-79 (1983) (ar-
guing that a free exercise issue must be addressed first, since government efforts to remedy a burden it has
placed on free exercise cannot be deemed to have the purpose or primary effect of advancing religion). But
see McConnell, supra note 83, 32-34 (criticizing Justice O'Connor's limitation of corrections for free exercise
violations to government imposed burdens. According to McConnell, there is a permissible class of govern-
ment actions toward religion between accommodations required by free exercise and benefits to religion pro-
hibited by the establishment clause, therefore religious liberty is not enhanced by confining accommodation
to the minimum compelled by the Constitution).
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ing the Court to ignore its analytical scheme in one
acknowledgement case 7' and apply it weakly in another.' 7'
The fourth principle of separation is a value akin to neutrality,
and has likewise undergone a similar metamorphosis. Adopting
Thomas Jefferson's famous "wall" metaphor used in a letter to
the Danbury Baptist Association, the Court in Everson also
described the mandated separation of church and state in abso-
lute terms. 7 On this point, the entire Court agreed as to the degree
of separation required, with the majority describing the "wall of
separation" as "high and impregnable"'73 while the dissent called
for "complete and permanent" separation.
The absolutist approach has, however, never proved to be work-
able. In fact, the Court admitted rather quickly that the constitu-
tionally mandated principle of separation between government and
the church was a question of degree.' 75 By the time the Burger
Court undertook its review of the parochial aid cases of the 1970s,
the Court affirmed that the separation principle did not require
total separation, and conceded that the wall metaphor had degener-
ated to a "blurred, indistinct and variable barrier." 7 ' The separa-
tion principle which emerges from the decisions, though by no
means absolute, is best characterized as requiring the avoidance
of "too close a proximity"'7" between religion and government so
170. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
17 1. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Although Justice O'Connor first espoused her Endorsement
Theory in her concurring opinion in Lynch, she applied it with less than enthusiastic vigor to the facts of that
case by concluding that the town-sponsored creche was an acknowledgement rather than an endorsement of
religion. She ignored what is at the very heart of the endorsement concept - the relevance of religion to one's
standing in the political community. In emphasizing the connection of the creche to the historical origins of
a national holiday, Justice O'Connor failed to discuss the communicative impact of the creche or the symbolic
union between one set of religious beliefs and the state. See Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion
Clauses, Liberal Neutrality and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 190-91 (arguing
that Justice O'Connor's great degree of tolerance for government sponsorship of religious symbols weakens
her concept of what is endorsement).
172. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
173. Id. at 18. For criticisms of the Court's use of the "wall" metaphor, see Oaks, Introduction in THE WALL
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 1, 3 (D. Oaks ed., 1963); Hutchins, The Future of the Wall in THE WALL
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 17, 19 (D. Oaks ed., 1963). But see Fey, A Protestant View: An Argument
for Separation in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 26 (D. Oaks ed., 1963) (arguing that the "wall"
as Jefferson used it "means a distinction, a limitation, a definition of fields of competence and authority," there-
fore "clarifies rather than confuses thoughts." Id. at 37-38.).
174. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
175. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
176. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
177. Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, ., concurring).
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as to prevent intrusion of one into the precinct of the other.'78 It
is this ideal which necessitates the retention of and is adequately
safeguarded by the entanglement inquiry under the Complete En-
dorsement Analysis.
A fifth principle which has run throughout establishment clause
jurisprudence is that government should avoid relationships with
religion which lead to financial support, sponsorship, and active
involvement in religious activity. "' This principle is left unprotect-
ed under Justice O'Connor's revised Lemon Test, which both limits
the issue of actual endorsement to the perception created by
government action and eliminates entanglement as a separate in-
quiry. 8 The Complete Endorsement Analysis, which includes the
promotion of religious purposes or activities within its definition
of endorsement, addresses the concern of financial support and
sponsorship. Additionally, the framework's retention of the en-
tanglement inquiry guards against the active involvement of the
state in church affairs.
Finally, as a sixth principle, the avoidance of political divisive-
ness over religion which tends to strain a political system in an
unhealthy way 1' has been recognized as a central concern behind
the establishment clause.'82 Its status in the hierarchy of first
amendment values led the Court to include political divisiveness
as a separate consideration under the entanglement prong of the
Lemon Test. As previously discussed, the Court soon began ques-
tioning its ability to use the principle as part of the analytical frame-
work. First, it conceded that political divisiveness, standing alone,
was insufficient as a basis for finding an establishment clause vio-
lation.8 3 Second, it limited its application to cases involving direct
subsidies to parochial schools. 8'
These restrictions do not lessen the significance of political divi-
siveness as an establishment clause value, but rather point to its
178. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. C. 3232, 3237 (1985). But see Beschle, supra note 171 at 151-52 (arguing
that liberal neutrality, rather than separation, is more realistic and fruitful for establishment clause analysis.
Beschle defines liberal neutrality as government avoidance of influence over individual choices on religion
through policies which give incentives to choose one value system over another. He considers Justice O'Con-
nor's endorsement theory as the best example of neutrality).
179. Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3221 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971);
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
181. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
182. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1983).
183. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973).
184. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 n. lH (1983).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
misplaced position in the Lemon analytical framework.' Because
the potential for divisiveness is at best speculative, the interest
of protecting it as a constitutional value is best served by focus-
ing on the cause of the divisiveness, rather than on the divisive-
ness itself." Endorsement, by its very nature, addresses the effects
of government actions toward religion as they affect an individu-
al's standing in the political community.'87 The Complete Endorse-
ment Analysis clearly seeks to avoid the kind of government
activity which divides people along religious lines, namely govern-
ment endorsement or disapproval of religion.
APPLICATION OF THE COMPLETE ENDORSEMENT ANALYSIS
Application of the Complete Endorsement Analysis to three
broad areas which have persistently troubled the Court serves to
illustrate its primacy over the simple Endorsement Analysis of
Justice O'Connor. The areas of difficulty have been parochial aid,
religion in the public schools, and the religious symbols cases.
A brief comment on each of these demonstrates the effectiveness
of endorsement in resolving a wide range of establishment clause
issues.
As the previous discussion of the parochial aid cases indicates, 8 '
any attempt to apply a new or altered analysis does not begin with
a clean slate. However, the Complete Endorsement Analysis is
particularly appropriate for the unification of this line of cases
for three reasons. First, the Analysis clarifies and galvanizes im-
portant prior distinctions made by the Court, but left as yet unex-
plained.' 89 Second, the new framework, which is based on
articulated principles, provides a clearer distinction between per-
missible and impermissible parochial aid. Finally, the Court's
185. See Giannella, supra note 6 at 167 (pointing out that political divisiveness offers no practical standards
for distinguishing between healthy and constitutionally permissible controversy and political fragmentation and
divisiveness which runs afoul of the establishment clause. As a result, Giannella argues that political divisive-
ness must be tied to another principle or concept if it is to comprise a workable judicial standard).
186. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 687.
188. See supra notes 85-121 and accompanying text.
189. For example, the distinction between whether or not remedial educational services are provided by the
state on or off of the campus of the parochial school is difficult to explain under the Lemon Test, but comes
into focus when the communicative aspects of endorsement are considered. See Grand Rapids v. Ball, 105
S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
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recognition of the Complete Endorsement Analysis will result in
minimal alterations of prior holdingst °
Consistent with Lemon precedent, most, if not all, aid programs
will have little difficulty satisfying the inquiry of intent to endorse
or disapprove religion, as was true of the "purpose" prong of the
Lemon Test."9 ' Clearly, the operative inquiries will be those of
endorsement-in-fact and excessive entanglement. Under the first
of these, endorsement-in-fact, the issue of whether government
has promoted the religious mission of an institution relies heavi-
ly on the Lemon decisions dealing with the "primary effect" prong
of the old analysis. As already noted, this query is important in
the parochial school area, particularly in guarding against govern-
mental financial support, sponsorship or active involvement with
religion, which represents a key establishment clause concern.' 92
Additionally, the new inquiry into whether government has con-
veyed a message of endorsement is of particular significance in
evaluating the constitutionality of parochial aid, since permissi-
ble government action involves the perception created by its rela-
tionship with religion, as well as the degree to which money flows
from the state to religion. Furthermore, this lends an attractive
clarification for some of the rather tenuous lines drawn by the
Court.'93 As previously noted, prior judicial distinctions simply
cannot be explained under the "effect" prong of the Lemon Test,"'
but they very quickly come into focus under the Complete En-
dorsement Analysis. Finally, the entanglement inquiry remains
a valuable tool in measuring the extent of permissible aid to reli-
giously affiliated schools. Although it has the effect of eliminat-
190. An application of the Complete Endorsement Analysis, while clarifying prior lines drawn between per-
missible and impermissible aid programs, would only require re-evaluation in two areas. First, the loaning
of textbooks to children attending non-public schools. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Se-
cond, tuition reimbursement and tax relief to parents of children attending non-public schools should also be
re-evaluated. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Since textbooks, secular or
otherwise, go to the heart of the educational process, any attempt to ensure that their use will not promote
the religious missions of schools which are permeated with religion are by definition inexpedient. Under the
Complete Endorsement Analysis, the promotion of the religious mission or activities of religious institutions
by government is clearly an endorsement of religion. Tax relief and tuition reimbursements to parents of chil-
dren attending public schools should not have to turn on whether the same benefit is provided to all school
children, so long as religious schools are not singled out for special benefit. Since this type of aid would be
provided to children attending both religious and non-religious schools, government would not run the risk
of communicating a message of endorsement, and likewise would only indirectly promote the religious mis-
sions of the parochial schools whose students are the recipients of such benefits.
191. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 189.
194. See Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools - An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REv.
5, 7 (1987) (pointing out that the Court's distinction between on-campus and off-campus aid, while presenting
an interesting geographical distinction, is difficult to justify as having constitutional significance).
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ing most forms of direct aid to elementary and secondary
non-public schools, it remains the crucial factor in assessing the
validity of such aid to colleges and universities.
The Complete Endorsement Analysis likewise provides a bet-
ter framework for addressing the proper role of religion in pub-
lic schools. While the "purposes" and "effects" prongs of the
original Lemon Test provided an adequate basis for addressing
the establishment clause concerns related to religious exercises
and observances in the schools,19 they simply were unequipped
to deal with the issues of accommodation of religious practices
and acknowledgment of religion in the public school setting. In
this context, the inquiry into whether government has in fact en-
dorsed religion is crucial to the resolution of this establishment
clause issue, and provides the Court with sufficient leeway to pro-
tect free exercise concerns without undue conflict between the
two religion clauses of the first amendment.
Finally, the communicative aspects of the endorsement-in-fact
prong of the Complete Endorsement Analysis provide a much
more insightful establishment clause inquiry in the religious symbol
cases. Under Lemon and its progeny the "primary effect" inquiry
proved difficult to apply outside the area of parochial aid; partic-
ularly so in the symbolism cases.19 ' Therefore, the communica-
tive dimensions of the Endorsement Analysis offer welcomed
guidelines for determining whether or not there is an establish-
ment clause violation when government employs religious
symbols.
CONCLUSION
With the assurance that settled establishment clause values are
adequately safeguarded by the Complete Endorsement Analysis,
the final dimension of the approach's sufficiency as a viable al-
ternative to Lemon is its ability to produce principled results. It
succeeds for three reasons.
First, Endorsement better captures the essence of establishment
clause design than prior articulations put forth by members of the
Court and other legal scholars. Its sweep, therefore, is sufficiently
broad to protect the major values upon which the Court has been
able to agree.
195. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
196. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Second, in its completed form, the Endorsement Analysis is
able to address the full spectrum of possible establishment clause
issues, not only the narrow category of concerns out of which
the analysis has developed. With the logical expansion of
endorsement-in-fact to include direct promotions of religious pur-
poses as well as perceptions of endorsement, the framework pro-
vides the necessary analysis for both parochial aid issues and
matters related to the infusion of religion into traditionally public
and secular settings.
Finally, the Complete Endorsement Analysis offers hope of
more rational and consistent results, in addition to some measure
of predictability for legislators charged with the responsibility of
drafting statutes that comport with the Constitution. The degree
to which Endorsement is able to achieve consistency and predic-
tability is dependent on the extent to which the Court is willing
to rely on the analysis. The specific articulation of what is
endorsement-in-fact, however, leaves less room for manipulation
of the standard than existed under the Lemon Test. Consequent-
ly, this approach achieves cohesion without creating unrealistic
rigidity.

